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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

73 327

54-51

SECRET

EXCISE

Action

Control: 18842

IO

Rec'd: October 26, 1962

4:42 p.m.

Info

FROM: New York

SS

TO: Secretary of State

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SP

NO: 1479, October 26, 4 p.m.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	
T.W. HANSEN	
REVIEWED BY	DATE FEB 29 1984
CLASSIFIED SECRET	
REASON(S) DATE 0402	
TS AUTH. TWA	REASON(S) 1.5(C)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS	1.3(2)(3)(7)
DECLASSIFIED	1.3(2)
RELEASE DENIED	IN PART
PA OF FOI EXEMPTIONS	B-1

FOIA E303506 II-A

YOST AND PLIMPTON MET AT 11:30 AM AT SECRETARIAT WITH SYG, LOUTFI, RIKHYE AND NARASIMHAN. WE EXPLAINED STEVENSON IN WASHINGTON AND THAT HE WOULD ARRIVE IN AFTERNOON AND WOULD CALL SYG FOR APPOINTMENT, AND THAT WE WERE MERELY GIVING PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS PENDING HIS ARRIVAL.

1. SYG SAID HE HAD APPOINTMENTS WITH ZORIN (USSR) AT 4:30 PM AND WITH CUBANS AT 5:30 PM. APPOINTMENT WITH ZORIN IS TENTATIVE AND WILL NOT TAKE PLACE UNLESS ZORIN HAS RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW.
2. SYG SAID FIRST QUESTION WAS WHETHER, IF SOVIETS SUSPENDED, DURING TWO OR THREE-WEEK NEGOTIATION PERIOD, SAILING OF ALL OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE SHIPS TO CUBA, US WOULD CALL OFF BLOCKADE.
3. SYG INDICATED HE FAVORED SUCH SUSPENSION SINCE PROBLEM OF INSPECTION OF BLOC SHIPS WOULD BE AVOIDED.
4. HE ALSO ASKED WHETHER US BLOCKADE WOULD BE SUSPENDED IF SOVIETS AGREED TO INSPECTION, EITHER AT POINT OF EMBARKATION OR IN CUBA, OF ALL-BLOC SHIPS BOUND FOR CUBA.
5. WE POINTED OUT THAT BLOCKADE WAS NOT AIMED AT SHIPS BUT AT CARGO CONSISTING OF WEAPONS, AND THAT WEAPONS MIGHT WELL BE INCLUDED IN THE CARGO OF NON-BLOC SHIPS CHARTERED BY BLOC, AND ALSO IN CARGO OF NON-BLOC SHIPS NOT CHARTERED BY BLOC.
6. SYG HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT THOUGHT OF PROBLEM OF BLOC-CHARTERED SHIPS, BUT SEEMED TO AGREE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE COVERED.

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ATTACHMENT NO. 2

DOCUMENT NO. 72

~~SECRET~~

-2- 1479, October 26, 4 p.m. from New York

7. THERE FOLLOWED DISCUSSION AS TO PRACTICAL LIKELIHOOD OF WEAPONS BEING INCLUDED IN CARGO OF NON-BLOC SHIPS. WE POINTED OUT WEAPONS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT, ETC., MIGHT BE INCLUDED IN CARGO AS "MACHINERY"; NARASIMHAN SAID SUCH EQUIPMENT COULD COME IN BY AIRCRAFT ANYWAY.

8. WE SAID THAT QUESTION ON NON-BLOC SHIPPING WAS ONE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN FURTHER CONSIDERATION BY WASHINGTON.

9. AT FIRST OPPORTUNITY WE POINTED OUT THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE US IS THE REMOVAL OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND INSTALLATIONS FROM CUBA, AND NOT A STANDSTILL. WE FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS THE POSITION OF ALL OF LA, WHICH WAS AS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE NUCLEAR THREAT AS IS THE US, AND THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SAID TO BE ESSENTIAL TO THE DEFENSE OF CUBA.

10. WE THEN POINTED OUT THAT THE IMMEDIATE CONCERN OF THE US AND LA WAS AS TO:

(A) THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY MORE OFFENSIVE WEAPONS OR MATERIEL THEREOF

(B) THE CESSATION OF FURTHER WORK ON THE LAUNCHING SITES, AND

(C) MAKING SURE THAT THE MISSILES IN CUBA SHOULD BE NON-OPERATIONAL.

11. WE SAID THAT ALL THREE OF THESE PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH, AND THAT THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WOULD HAVE TO BE SATISFIED WITH GUARANTEES AS TO ALL THREE POINTS.

12. SYG SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE UP WITH CUBA THE CONTINUED CONSTRUCTION AT THE SITES.

13. NARASIMHAN POINTED OUT THAT THE QUARANTINE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE CONSTRUCTION PROBLEM, AND THAT THE TWO WERE NOT TIED TOGETHER. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE QUARANTINE WAS INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE WHOLE SITUATION, AND NOT JUST THE IMPORTATION OF WEAPONS. THUS, IF CONSTRUCTION OF THE SITE WERE TO CONTINUE, THE US MIGHT WELL HAVE TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TIGHTENING THE QUARANTINE, APPLYING IT, FOR EXAMPLE, TO PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO CUBA.

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-3- 1479, October 26, 4 p.m. from New York

14. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SITES WAS BEING DONE BY THE SOVIETS, AND NOT BY THE CUBANS, AND THAT, INDEED, WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CUBANS WERE EXCLUDED FROM THE SITES AND FROM DECISIONS AS TO THE SITES.

15. SYG ASKED WHETHER US REALLY THOUGHT CUBA WOULD START OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST US. WE REPLIED US WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BY CUBA BUT BY SOVIET UNION, AND THAT THE REAL CONCERN OF US WAS WITH THE INCREASE IN SOVIET NUCLEAR CAPABILITY, UPSETTING THE EQUALIBRIUM.

16. SYG SAID HE AGREED THAT WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS AN INCREASE IN SOVIET STRIKING POWER.

17. SYG THEN SAID HE THOUGHT BASIC CAUSE OF THE WHOLE SITUATION WAS CUBAN FEAR OF US INVASION, AND HE QUOTED THE DORTICOS SPEECH BEFORE THE GA TO THE EFFECT THAT IF THE US WOULD GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO INVASION OF CUBA OR AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA, AND WOULD GUARANTEE TO STOP OTHERS FROM DOING SO, THEN CUBA WOULD DISMANTLE ALL OF ITS DEFENSES.

18. THE SYG ASKED AS TO WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE US TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT, PRESUMABLY AFTER THE ELECTIONS WERE OVER.

19. WE SAID THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT MIGHT AT LATER STAGE BE SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THAT THE PRESENT CONCERN WAS WITH THE THREAT OF SOVIET WEAPONS.

20. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE MANY CUBAN EXILES PRESENTED A PROBLEM AND THAT THERE WERE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS SUCH AS CUBAN SUBVERSION, PROPAGANDA, ETC., INVOLVED.

21. THE SYG SAID IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THE CIA WAS TRAINING CUBAN EXILES, AND HE ALSO REFERRED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, QUICKLY SAYING, HOWEVER, THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO BRING THAT SITUATION UP.

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-4- 1479, October 26, 4 p.m. from New York

23. THE SYG ASKED HOW THE US WOULD FEEL IF 300,000 TURKISH REFUGEES WERE BEING GIVEN MILITARY TRAINING BY THE SOVIET UNION, WITH A VIEW TO HELPING THEM GO BACK TO TURKEY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVT, AND IF TURKEY SHOULD ASK FOR ASSISTANCE OR NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO HELP DEFEND TURKEY -- WOULD WE NOT RESPOND?
24. HE LATER PUT SOMEWHAT THE SAME QUESTION AS TO BURMA, ASKING WHETHER IF COMMUNIST CHINA OPENLY THREATENED BURMA, THE US WOULD NOT BE WILLING TO GIVE BURMA NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
25. WE SMILINGLY SAID THAT WE WERE AGAINST THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WOULD NOT GIVE THEM TO BURMA.
26. THE SYG AGAIN SAID THAT WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON A US STATEMENT THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA.
27. WE REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT THINK THE SOVIET MOTIVE IN BRINGING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CUBA WAS TO PROTECT CUBA, BUT THAT IT WAS TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MORE POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC POWER AS REGARDS BERLIN AND OTHER ISSUES HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH CUBA, AND THAT CUBA WAS MERELY A SOVIET PAWN IN THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL POWER CHESS GAME.
28. NARASIMHAN SUGGESTED THAT THE MISSILES WERE RETALIATORY IN PURPOSE, BROUGHT IN AS A DETERRENT AGAINST ATTACK BY THE US, AND THE SYG AGAIN SAID THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES WAS CUBAN FEAR.
29. WE POINTED OUT THAT THE US HAD NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AIMED AT CUBA, AND THAT NONE WOULD EVER BE EMPLOYED AGAINST CUBA, SO THAT CUBANNUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS WERE DISPROPORTIONATE DEFENSE MEASURE.
30. NARASIMHAN REFERRED TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT CUBANS WERE TO BE ADMITTED TO THE US ARMY, AND INDICATED THAT CUBANS FEARED THAT SEPARATE EXILE FORMATIONS WERE BEING ORGANIZED FOR INVASION PURPOSES (WE WOULD LIKE TO BE FURNISHED FACTS FOR TRANSMISSION TO NARAIMHAN, INCLUDING PRESUMABLY DENIAL OF SEPARATE FORMATIONS AND FACT THAT CUBANS SCATTERED IN ORDINARY US ARMY ORGANIZATION).
31. AS REGARDS INSPECTION, NARASIMHAN POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY AS REGARDS CONSTRUCTION WORK ON THE SITES,

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-5- 1479, October 26, 4 p.m. from New York

IN VIEW OF PHOTOGRAPHIC SURVEILLANCE. SYG SUGGESTED THAT US INFORM HIM EACH MORNING AND AFTERNOON AS TO ANY PROGRESS OF SUCH CONSTRUCTION. INFO COULD BE GIVEN TO NARASIMHAN OR RIKHYE.

32. WE MADE CLEAR OUR VIEW THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE VERIFICATION ON THE SPOT AND AERIAL SURVEILLANCE NOT SUFFICIENT.

33. SYG SUGGESTED THAT US AGREEMENT TO INSPECTION OF US TO ENSURE THAT CIA IS NOT TRAINING CUBAN EXILES WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR CUBA TO AGREE TO INSPECTION OF MISSILE SITES, ETC. WE POINTED OUT THAT ANY POSSIBLE THREAT OF CUBAN EXILES WAS NOT AT ALL COMPARABLE TO THE NUCLEAR THREAT POSED BY THE CUBAN MISSILE SITES.

34. WE ASKED WHAT THE SYG'S VIEWS WERE AS TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE LAST TWO LETTERS BETWEEN HIM AND THE PRESIDENT, TO GIVE THE PUBLIC SOME EVIDENCE OF THE RELAXATION IN THE SITUATION.

35. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED NOW, SINCE HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT INCLUDED HIS LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV, AND KHRUSHCHEV HAD NOT YET REPLIED.

36. IF AND WHEN KHRUSHCHEV REPLIES, IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE TO RELEASE THE CORRESPONDENCE IF KHRUSHCHEV AGREES.

37.

38. THE SYG SAID HE HAD BEEN VERY MUCH UPSET BY THE REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON THAT HIS PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MET WITH A CHILLY RECEPTION, AND THAT IT WOULD BE POLITELY DECLINED BY THE US GOVT.

39. WE SAID THAT THE REPORTS WERE COMPLETELY INCORRECT, AND THAT NOTHING REALLY COULD BE DONE ABOUT THE SPECULATIONS THAT AMERICAN NEWSPAPERMEN INDULGE IN.

40. IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY ABOUT THE MEETING.

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-6- 1479, October 26, 4 p.m. from New York

41. AFTER THE MEETING, NARASIMHAN COMPLAINED REGARDING US MISSION NEWS BRIEFING STATEMENT, DAY OR TWO AGO, THAT US DID NOT INTEND TO BE TRICKED DURING NEGOTIATIONS. WE POINTED OUT THAT THIS OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT SOVIET DUPLICITY DURING NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT IT COULD NOT CONCEIVABLY HAVE BEEN INTENDED TO REFER TO THE SYG.

42. COMMENT:

THIS SHOULD OBVIOUS
BE KEPT VERY MUCH IN MIND IN DEALING WITH NEWS MEDIA. *B-15*

43. COMMENT: ATMOSPHERE OF CONFERENCE WAS FRIENDLY, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT TROUBLE LIES AHEAD AS REGARDS:

(A) SYG ASSUMPTION THAT QUARANTINE RELATED ONLY TO IMPORTATION OF WEAPONS,

(B) DESIRE OF SYG TO GET QUARANTINE SUSPENDED IF SOVIETS SUSPEND BLOC SHIPPING OR AGREE TO INSPECTION OF BLOC SHIPPING,

(C) DESIRE OF SYG FOR US STATEMENT AS TO NON-INVASION OF CUBA,

(D) POSSIBLE CONTENTION THAT INSPECTION OF SITES UNNECESSARY IN VIEW OF US AERIAL SURVEILLANCE, AND

(E) PROBLEM OF NON-OPERABILITY OF MISSILES, WHICH WAS NOT MUCH DISCUSSED. PLIMPTON

Note: Advance copies to IO, ARA, SS, SP 10/26/62. EH

LTR/14

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